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A novel experiment is used to show that the effect of a policy on the level of cooperation is greater
when it is chosen democratically by the subjects than when it is exogenously imposed. In contrast
to the previous literature, our experimental design allows us to control for selection effects (e.g. those
who choose the policy may be affected differently by it). Our finding implies that democratic institutions
may affect behavior directly in addition to having effects through the choice of policies. Our findings





















  The study of institutions is key to our understanding of the determinants of 
economic performance (see North 1981, La Porta et al. 1998, Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson 2001, and Easterly and Levine 2003 among others). In this paper we study how 
democratic institutions affect behavior. The central idea is that in addition to affecting the 
choice of policies, democratic institutions may affect behavior directly. We argue and 
provide experimental evidence that the same policy may have different effects depending 
on whether it was democratically selected or not, even after controlling for differences in 
the types of individuals who choose such a policy.  
  While the idea that democracy may influence the effect of policies can be traced 
to Tocqueville (1838),
1 our contribution consists of identifying this effect of democracy. 
We present results from a series of experiments designed to determine whether a policy 
that was exogenously imposed has the same effect as the same policy when it is 
democratically (that is, endogenously) chosen. In these experiments, subjects participate 
in several prisoners’ dilemma games and may choose, by simple majority, to establish a 
policy that could encourage cooperation. This policy consists of a fine on unilateral 
defection, which transforms the game into a coordination game in which both mutual 
defection and mutual cooperation are Nash equilibria. In some cases the experimental 
software randomly overrides the votes of the subjects and randomly imposes, or not, the 
policy. Before proceeding to play again with either the original or the modified payoffs, 
the subjects are informed of whether payoffs are modified and whether it was decided by 
                                                 
1 “It is not always feasible to consult the whole people, either directly or indirectly, in the formation of the 
law; but it cannot be denied that, when such a measure is possible, the authority of the law is much 
augmented. This popular origin, which impairs the excellence and wisdom of legislation, contributes 
prodigiously to increase its power.” Tocqueville (1838), pag. 228. On other theories stating that political 
participation is intrinsically beneficial see Pateman (1970), Thompson (1970), and Finkel (1985).   3
their vote or by the computer.  This setup allows us to compare the behavior of 
individuals and groups that voted in the same way and were presented with the same 
game (coordination versus prisoner’s dilemma) but differed by whether the game was 
chosen endogenously (democratically chosen by the subjects) or exogenously (randomly 
chosen by the computer). By conditioning on the subjects’ vote, we control for the fact 
that those that voted for the policy may differ in important ways from those who did not 
(for example, subjects that choose the policy may be more likely to value cooperative 
behavior and cooperate after the policy is implemented). As we condition on the subjects’ 
vote, any remaining effect associated with endogenous choice of the policy cannot be due 
to differences between those that voted for the policy and those that did not. That is, the 
difference cannot be attributed to selection. 
  Even after controlling for selection, the results show that the effect of the policy 
(i.e., the fine) on the percentage of cooperative actions is significantly greater when it is 
democratically chosen by the subjects (endogenous) than when it is imposed by the 
computer (exogenous). We find that the effect of the fine on cooperation is 40% larger if 
it is imposed democratically. Our results suggest that the treatment effect of a policy (that 
is, its causal impact on behavior) depends on whether it is democratically chosen or not. 
This implies that the same policy may have different effects depending on whether it was 
democratically selected or autocratically imposed, even controlling for selection. 
   The observed difference in experimental outcomes between exogenous and 
endogenous policies is consistent with evidence from field settings. Bardhan (2000) finds 
that farmers are less likely to violate irrigation rules when they themselves have crafted 
those rules. Frey (1998) finds that Swiss cantons with greater democratic participation   4
face lower tax evasion. A literature on worker participation in workplace decisions finds 
that such participation positively affects productivity provided that some of the material 
gains also accrue to the workers (see Levine and Tyson 1990, and Bonin, Jones and 
Putterman 1993). While these findings from the field suggest that democratic institutions 
may affect cooperative behavior, they can also be explained by unobservable 
characteristics of the actors that affect both the degree of democratic decision making and 
individual behavior. In contrast, our experimental design allows us to control for potential 
unobservable characteristics that could be related to democratic decision making by 
randomizing the existence of democratic institutions. An emergent literature in 
development economics on the effects of local democracy (e.g., Foster and Rosenzweig 
2005, and Besley, Pande and Rao 2005) has also paid attention to plausibly exogenous 
sources of variation in democracy but has largely ignored the possible direct effects of 
democratic institutions.
2 
There are extensive literatures considering the role of rewards and punishments in 
games
3 and exploring the effect of voting on the availability of rewards and punishments 
in voluntary contribution games.
4 This second literature studies the total effect of 
democratically allowing for rewards and punishments. For example, Sutter, Haigner and 
Kocher (2005) find that rewards and punishments are more effective when they are 
allowed democratically, and call this a “democratic participation rights premium.” 
                                                 
2 Our results are also related to the social psychology literature on procedural justice (see for example 
Thibaut and Walker 1975 and Lind and Tyler 1988). This literature has shown that subjects’ evaluation of a 
given outcome may depend on the fairness of the procedures that have led to that outcome. An important 
element studied in this literature is whether subjects have an opportunity to express their opinions during 
the procedure (on “voice” see Folger 1977 and van den Bos 1999). For the related idea in economics of 
procedural utility see Frey, Benz and Stutzer (2004). For a discussion of the effects of institutions on 
behavior that combines economics and psychology see Bohnet (2006). 
3 See e.g. Fehr and Gächter (2000), Falkinger et al. (2000), and Andreoni, Harbaugh and Vesterlund (2003). 
4 See e.g., Botelho, et al. (2005), Ertan, Page and Putterman (2005), and Sutter, Haigner and Kocher (2005).   5
However, their results could be due to unobservable characteristics affecting both how 
groups vote and their response to rewards and punishments. 
In contrast, our experimental design allows us to control for potential 
unobservable characteristics by comparing groups and individuals that were both 
exogenously formed and voted in the same way. This allows us to separate the total effect 
of an endogenous policy into a selection effect (due to differences across groups that vote 
differently) and a treatment effect (the real causal effect) and to study how the treatment 
effect varies depending on whether the policy was democratically chosen or exogenously 
imposed. We find that the total effect of an endogenous change of payoffs can be 
decomposed into 8% selection effect and 92% endogenous treatment effect. In addition, 
we find that the endogenous treatment effect is 40% greater than the exogenous treatment 
effect. 
More generally, there are a number of papers comparing behavior in a given game 
when it was exogenously given and when it was chosen by the subjects.
5 While 
differences in behavior are sometimes considered evidence of selection, in other cases 
they are considered evidence that endogeneity affects behavior. Our main methodological 
contribution is to separate the total effect of endogeneity into a selection effect and an 
endogeneity premium. 
Finally, there is also an extensive experimental literature on the issue of 
cooperation and its determinants (see Kagel and Roth 1995 for a survey of the literature), 
and a growing experimental literature that studies the determinants of voting turnout and 
                                                 
5 See for example Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1993), Bohnet and Kübler (2005), Potters, Sefton and 
Vesterlund (2005), Charness, Fréchette and Qin (2006) and Lazear, Malmendier and Weber (2006).    6
the effects of different voting rules on information aggregation and efficiency.
6 Palfrey 
(2005) provides a useful survey of the experimental literature on political economy in 
general.  
Our findings have two main implications. The first is that democratic institutions 
may affect not only the types of policies adopted but also the impact of a given policy, so 
that a policy democratically selected will not have the same effect when imposed 
undemocratically. The second implication relates to the study of treatment effects more 
generally. Much applied work in economics seeks to identify the treatment effect of 
policies, institutions, or products. Since people usually choose their policies, institutions 
and products, it is necessary to account for selection into treatment to measure the “true” 
treatment effect (i.e. one that does not reflect selection). Based on such estimates, policy 
recommendations may be made to assign the treatment without choice (that is, 
exogenously). Our experimental results suggest that such policy recommendations may 
be unwarranted given that the treatment effect may differ based on whether it is 
exogenously or endogenously determined, even after controlling for selection.  
 
2. Experimental Design 
In each experimental session, subjects participate anonymously through 
computers.
7 The subjects are randomly divided into groups of four for the entire session. 
Groups consist of four subjects so as to maximize the probability of a tie in the voting 
stage that is described below. Each session consist of two parts. In part 1, subjects play 
                                                 
6 See Schram and Sonnemans (1996), Morton and Williams (1999), Hung and Plott (2001), Goeree and 
Holt (2005), Großer and Schram (2006), Casella, Gelman and Palfrey (2006), Levine and Palfrey (2007), 
and Battaglini, Morton and Palfrey (2006) among others. 
7 We adapted the Multistage software by SSEL-Caltech/CASSEL-UCLA.   7
10 rounds of the prisoner’s dilemma game in Table 1 (Initial Payoffs).
8 The exchange 
rate is 50 points for one dollar. After each round each subject is randomly matched with 
another subject in his or her group for the next round. In part 2 of the experiment the 
subjects play 10 rounds as in part 1 but the payoffs can be modified at the beginning of 
this part to the payoffs in Table 1 (Modified Payoffs). The modification of payoffs 
consists of imposing a tax or fine on unilateral defection. While under the initial payoffs 
the unique Nash equilibrium is mutual defection, under the modified payoffs both mutual 
defection and mutual cooperation are Nash equilibria. 
 
Table 1: Stage Game Payoffs (in points) 
Initial Payoffs  Modified Payoffs 
 Other’s  action 
Own 
action 
 C  D 
C 50  10 
D 60  40 
   
 Other’s  action 
Own 
action 
 C  D 
C 50  10 
D 48  40 
     
 
We chose a prisoners’ dilemma game as the initial game as the tension between 
personal incentives and efficiency is not only an important feature of human interaction 
but also a feature that groups attempt to solve by imposing different kinds of policies. We 
chose a prisoners’ dilemma game over other kind of social dilemma games (i.e. public 
good games) as the former is simpler which allows a simple explanation of the policy. 
The modified game was chosen to be a coordination game as it is intuitive to think that 
                                                 
8 For neutrality, the actions C and D are denoted as 1 and 2 in the experimental sessions.   8
the incentive to follow policies and regulations may depend on the behavior of others and 
may result in a multiplicity of equilibria. 
  Whether the payoffs are modified in the policy selection stage is determined as 
follows. First, subjects vote on whether to modify payoffs. Second, the computer 
randomly chooses whether to consider the votes in each group. If the computer considers 
the votes, then the majority wins and in case of a tie the computer breaks the tie. If the 
computer does not consider the votes in a group, it randomly chooses whether to modify 
payoffs or not in that group. The voting stage is summarized in Figure 1.  The subjects’ 
computer screens inform them whether the computer randomly chose to consider the 
votes and whether payoffs were modified. The subjects do not learn the exact distribution 
of votes, including whether the computer needed to break a tie.
9 We denote the four 
possible outcomes of the voting stage as EndoMod, EndoNot, ExoMod and ExoNot, 
where Endo denotes that the votes of the group were considered, Exo denotes that the 
computer overrode the group and Mod denotes that payoffs were modified versus Not. 
After the voting stage, the subjects play 10 more rounds with other subjects in their 
group, with the payoff matrix depending on the results from the policy selection stage. 
After the ten rounds in part 2, the subjects answer a series of questions that allow 
us to assess the subjects’ understanding of the experimental design and their reasoning in 
the voting stage and after. In addition we ask them for personal characteristics such as: 
                                                 
9 Since subjects know whether the group voted for modification or not when the votes are considered while 
that is not the case when votes are not considered, some of the effect of democracy that we will be 
measuring may well stem from the institution’s informational effect.  In our view, this is one of the effects 
of voting institutions in many settings, not something extraneous to democracy that we “confound” with it.  
Nevertheless, as will be discussed in the conclusion, it is also of interest to distinguish informational from 
other effects of democracy, as we plan to do in future research.    9
academic major, class, math and verbal SAT scores,
10 political philosophy. These 
questions allow us to study how personal characteristics affect the voting decisions and 
the impact of the policy. Finally, the subjects participate in a “beauty contest” game in 
order to gauge their strategic sophistication.
11 
We present next a short theoretical analysis of the game subjects play in this 
experiment. First, note that under the initial payoffs (prisoner’s dilemma game) there is a 
unique Nash equilibrium in the stage game which is inefficient: both players play D. 
Second, under the modified payoffs (coordination game) there are two Nash equilibria in 
pure strategies, an efficient and an inefficient one: CC and DD, respectively. Since in the 
experiment there are a finite number of repetitions and in addition subjects are randomly 
re-matched after each round we expect that predictions from the one-shot games are valid 
also for the finite repetition (see Duffy and Ochs 2003). 
How should subjects vote? While modified payoffs allow subjects to cooperate in 
equilibrium, mutual defection remains an equilibrium outcome. As such, if subjects 
expect to coordinate in mutual defection under modified payoffs, they have no incentive 
to vote for modification. Sub-game perfection does not provide a prediction regarding 
vote behavior. The optimal vote depends on subjects’ expectation of others’ behavior 
under the modified payoffs game. Subjects that expect to achieve mutual cooperation 
under modified payoffs should vote for modification. In contrast, subjects that expect no 
                                                 
10 We believe that the self reported SAT scores can be trusted since Palacios Huerta (2003) found no 
misreporting of SAT scores among Brown undergraduates in a previous experiment. 
11 Each subject chose a number between zero and one hundred and the subject with the closest number to 
two thirds of the average of all numbers in the group earns 100 points. The unique Nash equilibrium of this 
game is to choose zero. See Bosch-Domènech, et al. (2002) and references therein for a detailed description 
of beauty contest games and the role of levels of strategic reasoning to explain behavior in these games.   10
change in behavior under modified payoffs have little incentive to vote for 
modification.
12 
Will subjects coordinate on the efficient outcome (CC) under modified payoffs? 
Under the modified payoffs the efficient outcome is an equilibrium outcome. However, 
previous experimental literature has shown the difficulty of coordinating on the efficient 
equilibrium in coordination games.
13 But if prior behavior affects behavior in the current 
game, having the subjects choose to modify payoffs may affect the equilibrium selection 
process in the resulting coordination game.
 14 Knowing that the coordination game was 
chosen by the group may increase the probability that the efficient equilibrium becomes 
focal. 
 
3. Strategies to identify the effect of democracy 
To estimate the impact of democracy we cannot simply compare cooperation rates 
across the four vote stage results (EndoMod, ExoMod, etc.). This is the case even when 
both the formation of groups and consideration of the votes were random. The reason is 
that while groups were randomly formed they are not necessarily identical. Groups with 
                                                 
12 Off equilibrium reasoning can justify voting for modification even for a defector. The reason is that if 
modification results in an increase in cooperation, a defector may obtain a higher profit. As such, voting for 
modification may be part of a “bait” strategy. 
13 For example Cooper et al. (1990) and Van Huyck et al. (1990), among others, have shown that in 
experimental coordination games subject may coordinate on the “safer” equilibrium over the efficient one. 
In our experiment, cooperation is optimal for a subject only if the partner cooperates with a probability 
higher than 30/32. Mutual cooperation is not very robust to uncertainty over others’ behavior. For this 
reason, we may observe that subjects coordinate on mutual defection under modified payoffs. 
14 See the literature on forward induction (Kohlberg and Mertens 1986, and van Damme 1989) and related 
experimental literature (Cooper et al. 1992, Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil 1993, and Cachon and Camerer 
1996). Note however that forward induction, as defined by van Damme (1989), has no bite in the game we 
analyze. Intuitively, the modification of payoffs does not affect the payoff from mutual defection (the 
unique equilibrium outcome under the initial payoffs) and, hence, voting for modification is not 
inconsistent with planning to defect. Moreover, it can be shown that the elimination of weakly dominated 
strategies does not eliminate the equilibrium in which subjects vote for modified payoffs and then defect 
even if payoffs are modified.   11
endogenous modification may be different from groups with exogenous modification: 
subjects in the former may have preferences for cooperative behavior that affect both 
cooperation and the decision to modify payoffs. In the presence of this type of selection, 
comparisons of cooperation levels between subjects in groups with endogenous and 
exogenous modifications can be misleading. 
To make this point explicit, and develop an appropriate identification strategy, we 
develop a simple formal framework. In particular, we consider a simplified game in 
which individuals are matched in groups, they vote, they learn the mechanism used to 
select payoffs (votes or randomly by the computer), they learn the payoffs (initial or 
modified), and then they play the stage game.
15 An individual i’s action in the stage game 
depends on the information available to him at that time. This information includes the 
mechanism that selected payoffs { } Exo Endo M , ∈  (votes or randomly by the computer), 
the payoffs chosen  {} Not Mod P , ∈  (modified and non-modified), his vote  {} N Y vi , ∈ , and 
his type μi. Thus we may write the probability that subject i cooperates as  
(1)  () i i i v P M C μ , , ,.  
The type μi includes any personal characteristic that is unobserved to the researcher but 
that may be correlated with both the subject’s probability of cooperation and his or her 
voting decisions. For example, the subject may have preferences for cooperative behavior 
that affect both cooperation and the decision to modify payoffs.
16 In addition, subjects 
may differ in their expectations of how often a modification of payoffs would result in 
                                                 
15 In particular we abstract from the fact that players may have learned something about people in their 
group from the pre-vote rounds.  This creates a potential inference problem, which we discuss below.  
16 On social preferences see Charness and Rabin (2002), Fehr and Fischbacher (2002), and Camerer and 
Fehr (2004) among others.   12
mutual cooperation and hence may have different propensities to vote for modification 
and to cooperate after a modification. 
In this framework, an individual’s vote can only depend on his type, as he is 
randomly matched with the others and does not know either their type or how they will 
vote 
(2) ( ) ii vv μ = . 
Further, (2) may be substituted into (1) to give, abusing notation, 
(3)  () i i P M C μ , ,.  
To test for differences in outcomes between endogenous and exogenous modifications, 
we test whether, given the payoff structure P (Mod or Not), actions differ by mechanism 
M (Endo versus Exo). Consider, then the expected difference in behavior by selection 
mechanism given a payoff structure P: 
(4) 
() ()
() () () () [] ∫ −
= −
i i i i i i i
i i
d P Exo f P Exo C P Endo f P Endo C
P Exo C E P Endo C E
μ μ μ μ μ , , , , , ,
, ,
 
where  () P M f i , μ  is the conditional density of the type given the selection mechanism 
and the payoff matrix.  Note further that P is informative about μ when payoffs are 
determined by voting but not when payoffs are determined by the computer and thus  
(5)  () () ( ) P Endo f P Exo f f i i i , , μ μ μ ≠ = . 
Thus the difference (4) may be non-zero even if there are no differences in behavior by 
mechanism:  () ( ) i i i i P Endo C P Exo C μ μ , , , , = .   13
  Similarly, to estimate differences that arise between exogenous and endogenous 
modification (i.e. whether there exists an endogeneity premium) we cannot simply 
compare cooperation averages: 
() () [] ( ) ( ) [ ] Not Exo C E Mod Exo C E Not Endo C E Mod Endo C E i i i i , , , , − − − . 
We employ two strategies to solve this identification problem.  
First, we use individual-level data and condition on both the payoff structure P 
and the individual vote vi. This approach works because 
() () ( ) i i i i i i v P f v P Exo f v P Endo f , , , , , μ μ μ = = : once one knows how somebody votes, 




() ( ) [] () ∫ −
= −
i i i i i i i i i
i i i i
d v P f v P Exo C v P Endo C
v P Exo C E v P Endo C E
μ μ μ μ , , , , , , ,
, , , ,
  
can only be non-zero if, for some positive measure set of types, behavior differs by 
mechanism (Endo versus Exo).
17 Our experimental design yields the data necessary to 
make this comparison. 
Second, we use group-level data and groups for which the vote is tied. Note that 
for these groups all four voting stage outcomes are possible. Moreover, as these groups 
voted in the same fashion, they should be similar in their personal characteristics. Their 
outcomes in the voting stage differed only due to random luck. Thus, the densities in (5) 
                                                 
17 The key condition here is that the votes of the other players are not correlated with a player’s type or with 
his vote. This is true given random assignment as long as individuals have no information about each other 
at the time of voting—something ruled out in our simplified framework but possible in the actual 
experiment because of the pre-vote rounds played by participants. We have shown using the same analytic 
methods that this problem can be addressed by conditioning on individual histories of play in the pre-vote 
rounds. Our analysis shows that, first, votes are statistically independent across members of each group 
and, second, our estimates are not affected by controlling for individual histories.   14
are equal:  () () P Endo f P Exo f i i , , μ μ = . As a result we can compare 
() () P Exo C E P Endo C E i i , , −  for these groups to uncover the effect of democracy. 
However, identifying the effects of democracy by focusing on these groups is done at a 
considerable loss of data as we can only use the small subset of the observations with a 
tied vote for this analysis. 
 
4. Experimental Results 
We conducted 18 experimental sessions from May to November 2006 in a 
computer lab at Brown University. A total of 276 subjects participated in the experiment, 
with an average of 15 subjects per session. The subjects were Brown University 
undergraduates recruited through advertisement in university web pages and signs posted 
on campus. Table 2 displays the characteristics of subjects. A high number of subjects 
correctly answered the questions regarding the experiment. For example, more than 90% 
of the subjects remembered correctly the result from the voting stage. The subjects earned 
an average of $24.57, with a maximum of $29.40 and a minimum of $17.60. Given that 
sessions lasted on average little more than half an hour, the earnings represent a 
significant hourly rate. 
  The average level of cooperation was 18% in the first part of the experiment. The 
level of cooperation was decreasing with experience, with a maximum of 31.9% in round 
1 and a minimum of 6.9% in round 10 (the last round of part 1). Both the level and 
evolution of cooperation in this experiment are similar to those on other experiments on 
prisoner’s dilemma games (see for example Cooper et al. 1996, Bereby-Meyer and Roth   15
2006, Dal Bó 2005, and Aoyagi and Fréchette 2003); they also resemble those in the 
voluntary contributions mechanism literature (Ledyard 1995). 
 
4.1. Results from the voting stage 
  Of the 276 subjects, 147 (53.26%) voted to modify payoffs and 129 (46.74%) 
voted not to modify payoffs in the second part of the experiment. Voting for modification 
(votemod) is positively and significantly correlated with the math SAT scores and 
negatively and significantly correlated with the number provided in the “beauty contest” 
game – see Table 3. This suggests that both cognitive ability and strategic sophistication 
are related to voting for modification of payoffs. Voting also seems to depend on the 
subjects’ experience in the first part of the experiment. Subjects that cooperated more and 
those that faced little cooperation are more likely to vote for modification. Surprisingly, 
neither the class, the political philosophy nor the major are correlated with the voting 
decisions. 
  The fact that a large proportion of subjects (46%) voted to remain in a prisoner’s 
dilemma game is of interest and has implications for the large political economy 
literature on inefficient polices and delayed reforms.
18 This experiment shows that 
subjects will not necessarily vote for reforms that may make efficient behavior incentive 
compatible. 
  We define the variable voteshare as the number of votes in favor of modification 
of payoffs in a group. This variable ranges from 0 to 4. The mode of the distribution of 
                                                 
18 See Coate and Morris (1995), and Dixit and Londregan (1995) on inefficient redistribution, and 
Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) and Alesina and Drazen (1991) on reform delays.   16
this variable is 2. There is evidence that voting decisions are independent within groups. 
Figure 2 shows the observed cumulative distribution function of voteshare (solid line) 
and the distribution that would arise if subjects decide their votes independently of each 
other (binomial, depicted as a dashed line). As Figure 2 shows there is little difference 
between the two distributions. In fact the difference is not statistically significant (p-
value=0.32).
19 A random-effects analysis of voting does not reject that there are no 
random-effects at the group level suggesting that voting decisions are independent within 
groups (p-value=0.368). 
  
4.2. Exogenous versus endogenous treatment effect: individual level analysis 
As discussed earlier, the difficulty identifying the effect of democracy is that the 
subjects in groups with endogenous modification may be different from those in groups 
with exogenous modification. In this section we solve this problem by conditioning on 
the voting behavior of the subject. Once we control for a subject’s vote, whether he or she 
is under endogenous or exogenous modification is uncorrelated with any unobserved 
personal characteristic. Thus, greater cooperation under endogenous versus exogenous 
modification is evidence that democracy affects behavior. 
In the analysis of the experimental data we initially focus on the behavior in round 
11 (the first round of part 2), because after round 11 the impact of the payoff 
modification on cooperation is not independent across subjects given that the actions of 
one player will affect the actions of the other players. Panel A in Table 4 shows the 
                                                 
19 Since the theoretical distribution is not continuous we do not use the usual Kolmogorov-Smirnov test but 
a modification proposed by Pettitt and Stephens (1977). The p-value is calculated by Monte Carlo 
simulation under the null that voteshare follows a binomial distribution with probability of success equal to 
the observed one (0.5326).   17
number of observations (subjects) by vote stage result and vote. The minimum number of 
observations in a cell is 17 and the maximum is 55.  
There is little difference in the cooperation rates in round 10 (the last round of 
part 1) by vote stage results (see panel B of Table 4). In fact, there are no statistical 
differences in cooperation (p-value 0.87).
20 Therefore, before the voting stage subjects 
are statistically identical in terms of their levels of cooperation. 
Panel C in Table 4 shows the percentage of cooperation at the beginning of part 2 
(round 11) by voting stage result and individual vote. Aggregating over the votes of the 
individuals, we observe that subjects under endogenous modification cooperated more 
than subjects under exogenous modification: 72% against 50%. This difference is 
statistically significant at the 1% level (p-value 0.003 – see Table 5, column 1). However, 
as discussed before, this difference is not an unbiased estimate of the effect of 
democracy. First, groups with endogenous modification have a larger share of subjects 
that voted for modification than groups with exogenous modification (see Table 4, panel 
A). Second, subjects who voted for modification are more likely to cooperate under 
modification than those who did not vote for modification (see Table 4, panel C). This 
may imply that another factor affects both the vote of the individual (which affects the 
voting stage result of his group) and his behavior in part 2, thereby biasing our estimates. 
However, as discussed previously, we can obtain an unbiased estimate by controlling for 
how the individuals voted. 
Among individuals who voted for modification, those who experienced an 
endogenous modification of payoffs (EndoMod) had levels of cooperation of 82% while 
                                                 
20 The p-values in this section correspond to Wald tests. The results are robust to performing Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney tests when applicable.   18
those who experienced an exogenous modification of payoffs (ExoMod) only had 58%. 
This difference is statistically significant at the 1% level (p-value 0.009 – Table 5, 
column 2). In addition, for players that voted for modification, there is no significant 
difference in cooperation under the original payoffs depending on whether votes were 
considered or not (24% versus 23.53%). These results are robust to controlling for own 
and observed behavior before the vote stage and eliminating subjects who did not 
remember the result of the voting stage. 
In conclusion, for subjects that voted for modification, we find that democracy 
does not affect behavior under initial payoffs but it does have a significant effect under 
modified payoffs. As a result, the effect of modifying payoffs is greater when the 
modification is endogenous than when it is exogenous: 57.82% versus 34.05% 
respectively.  
Among individuals who did not vote for modification, cooperation levels do not 
depend on the way that payoffs were chosen. In round 11, cooperation is 41.18% under 
endogenous modification and 41.94% under exogenous modification (p-value 0.95). 
The effect of democracy can also be seen in Figure 3. Figure 3 shows the 
percentage of cooperation by vote stage result, round and individual vote. It is interesting 
to note that cooperation generally increases in round 11 for most vote stage results. Part 
of this increase is presumably reflective of the well-known re-start effect in prisoner’s 
dilemma games (see Andreoni and Miller 1993). This jump tends to be larger for subjects 
that voted for modification, when payoffs are modified, and even larger when they are 
modified endogenously.   19
Interestingly, as Figure 3 shows, the difference in cooperation rates between 
individuals under endogenous modification (EndoMod) and exogenous modification 
(ExoMod) is not limited to round 11. However, after round 11 differences in cooperation 
between EndoMod and ExoMod cannot be fully attributed to the effect of democracy. 
This is because subjects under endogenous modification are more likely to meet a partner 
that voted for modification (and more likely to cooperate) than a subject under exogenous 
modification, and this can influence behavior in later rounds. To estimate the effect of 
democracy in later rounds it is necessary to control for the votes of partners that subjects 
meet in the second part of the experiment. In addition, we need to consider the fact that 
the behavior of a subject is not independent across rounds. A method for doing so is 
developed and described in detail in the appendix. As there is little difference in behavior 
between exogenous and endogenous initial payoffs, we focus on the effect of democracy 
under modification for the rest of the section.  
Table 6 presents the estimates of the effect of democracy under modified payoffs 
for all rounds after the voting stage. For subjects who voted for modification, the effect is 
the largest in round 14 when the effect reaches 32% and it is the lowest in round 13 when 
it is 20%. The effect is significant at least at the 10% level in all ten rounds after the 
voting stage, and significant at the 5% level in seven of the rounds. It cannot be rejected 
that all effects are the same and that it is the same in rounds 11 and 20, both at the 10% 
significance level. Therefore, for subjects that voted for modification, democracy has a 
stable, large and statistically significant effect on cooperative behavior. 
For subjects who did not vote to modify payoffs, Table 6 shows an interesting 
pattern in the evolution of the effect of democracy across rounds. While the effect is   20
negligible in round 11 it reaches a statistically significant level (31%) in round 13. The 
effect of democracy remains significant until round 16. This effect for subjects who did 
not vote to modify payoffs is due in part to their meeting subjects who voted to modify 
payoffs and being affected by their higher rate of cooperation under democracy. 
However, after round 16, the effect disappears for subjects who did not vote to modify 
payoffs. 
Finally, the responses of subject to the question at the end of the experiment on 
whether the voting stage had affected their behavior are consistent with their observed 
behavior. Subjects who voted for modification are significantly more likely to say that the 
voting stage modified their behavior under endogenous modification than under 
exogenous modification (p-value less than 0.01). In addition, a significant share of 
subjects that voted for modification mention whether votes were considered or not in 
explaining their behavior after the voting stage. 
In conclusion, the experimental results show that there is an effect of democratic 
institutions in addition to the instrumental effect through policy choice. 
 
4.3. Decomposing the total effect of an endogenous modification 
The individual level analysis allows us to separate the total effect of an 
endogenous modification of payoffs into a selection effect and an endogenous treatment 
effect. We can further separate this endogenous treatment effect into an exogenous 
treatment effect and an endogeneity premium (the part of the endogenous treatment effect 
that cannot be explained by the exogenous treatment effect). For simplicity we will focus 
on round 11 behavior to provide this decomposition of effects.    21
Total effect: 
From the totals in the first two columns in panel C of Table 4 we calculate the 
effect of the policy under democracy (EndoMod versus EndoNot) and find that the total 
effect of an endogenous modification on cooperation is 55%. Note that the totals of these 
columns can be calculated as weighted averages of the cooperation rates by type of vote 
if we use as weights the proportion of subjects that voted for and against modification. If 
we denote as  () M P v f ,  the proportion of subjects that voted for  { } N Y v , ∈  given the 
payoff structure  {} Not Mod P , ∈  and the mechanism  { } Exo Endo M , ∈  and we denote as 
() M P v C ,  the proportion of cooperation for subjects that voted for v given the payoff 
structure and mechanism, the total effect is: 





Not Endo v C Not Endo v f Mod Endo v C Mod Endo v f TE
,




  The selection effect captures the changes in cooperation that arise not from the 
change in treatment but from the change in the proportion of types of subjects. Thus, the 
selection effect can be measured as: 





Not Endo v C Not Endo v f Mod Endo v f SE
,
, , , . 
From Table 4 we calculate the selection effect as a 4% increase in the cooperation rate.
22 
 
                                                 
21 The total effect can be calculated from Table 4 as follows: TE=((17/72)41.18+(55/72)81.82)-
((55/80)14.55+(25/80)24)=54.72. 
22 SE=(17/72-55/80)14.55+(55/72-25/80)24=4.27.   22
Endogenous treatment effect: 
  The endogenous treatment effect corresponds to changes in cooperation due to an 
endogenous change in the payoff matrix and not due to changes in the proportion of the 
different types of voters. In addition the endogenous treatment effect must be equal to the 
difference between the total effect and the selection effect. Thus, the endogenous 
treatment effect is: 





Not Endo v C Mod Endo v C Mod Endo v f EndoTrE
,
, , , . 
From Table 4 we calculate the endogenous treatment effect as 50%.
23 
 
Exogenous treatment effect:  
The exogenous treatment effect corresponds to the change in cooperation due to 
an exogenous modification of payoffs. As such we must leave the proportion of the 
different types of voters constant but change the behavior due to exogenous modification. 
Moreover, the proportion of the different types of voters must be consistent with the ones 
used to calculate the endogenous treatment effect. Thus, we can calculate the exogenous 
treatment effect as: 





Not Exo v C Mod Exo v C Mod Endo v f ExoTrE
,
, , , . 




                                                 
23 EndoTrE=(17/72)(41.18-14.55)+(55/72)(81.82-24)=50.45. 
24 ExoTrE=(17/72)(41.94-3.85)+(55/72)(57.58-23.53)=36.   23
Endogeneity premium: 
  Having calculated the endogenous and exogenous treatment effects, we can 
calculate the endogeneity premium. The difference between the endogenous treatment 




  The total effect from endogenous modification of payoffs can be separated in 
three components: the selection effect, the exogenous treatment effect, and the 
endogeneity premium. Our estimates show that in this case the selection effect explains 
8% of the change in behavior, the exogenous treatment explains 66% and the endogeneity 
premium explains 26%. The difference between exogenous and endogenous treatment 
effects is large: the endogeneity premium is more than three times the size of the 
selection effect and more than 40% of the exogenous treatment effect. These results 
suggest that, even after controlling for selection, when studying the impact of institutions 
or policies on behavior it is important to distinguish whether they are endogenous or 
exogenous.  
 
4.4. Exogenous versus endogenous treatment effect: group level analysis 
  In this section we consider the group as the unit of analysis and we focus on 
groups with even split votes since they allow us to estimate the difference between 
exogenous and endogenous modification controlling for underlying characteristics of the   24
groups since they are essentially the same. The evidence we present is consistent with the 
idea that the effect of the payoff modifications depends on whether the modification was 
endogenous or exogenous to the group. However, the result is not conclusive due to the 
statistical power of the analysis (by looking at evenly split groups we loose 46 of the 69 
groups – see Table 7). 
  Table 8 shows the level of cooperation by the result of the voting stage and the 
vote share of the groups. There is little difference in the cooperation rates of groups with 
vote share 2 in part 1 (see panel A of Table 8). In fact, there are no statistical differences 
in cooperation (p-value 0.47).
 25 If anything, the groups with exogenous modification 
(ExoMod) cooperated more in the first part of the experiment than those with endogenous 
modification (EndoMod) but this difference is not statistically significant (p-value 0.24). 
Therefore, before the voting stage all groups were basically identical in terms of 
cooperation levels. 
  Focusing on groups with evenly split votes (voteshare=2), we observe that the 
cooperation levels after the voting stage under the initial payoffs are very similar between 
groups whose votes were considered (EndoNot) and those that were not (ExoNot): 8.44% 
and 9.38% respectively (panel B of Table 8). As democracy has no effect under initial 
payoffs, we can focus on the difference between endogenous and exogenous modification 
(EndoMod versus ExoMod) to calculate the difference in treatment effects. We find that 
groups with endogenous modification (EndoMod) had 51.67% cooperation after voting 
against 43.50% for the groups with exogenous modification (ExoMod). The statistical 
                                                 
25 For all the statistical tests in this section we only consider one observation per group. In this case the 
observation is the average cooperation rate in the group in the first ten rounds of the experiment. The p-
values correspond to Wald tests. The results are robust to performing Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests when 
applicable.   25
significance of these differences is provided in Table 9. The difference of 8% in favor of 
endogenous modification (EndoMod) versus exogenous modification (ExoMod) is not 
always statistically significant. It is significant at the 10% level if we eliminate from the 
analysis groups with subjects that did not remember the vote stage result. Finally, the 
payoff modification has a large effect on cooperation rates: a 43% and 34% increase for 
endogenous and exogenous modification. While this increase is always significant for 
endogenous modification (p-values less than 0.002, see Table 9) it is not significant for 
exogenous modification under all specifications.   
  To study the effect of democracy under modified payoffs (EndoMod versus 
ExoMod) we can also focus on the small number of groups with voteshare 3.
26 As shown 
in Table 8, of groups with voteshare 3, those under endogenous modification reach higher 
cooperation rates than those with exogenous modification (48% versus 32.5%). However, 
this difference is not statistically significant. Similarly, to study the effect of democracy 
under initial payoffs (EndoNot versus ExoNot) we can also focus on the small number of 
groups with voteshare 1. Consistent with previous results, Table 8 shows that there are no 
differences in cooperation between endogenous and exogenous initial payoffs for groups 
with voteshare 1 (11.67% versus 12.5%).  
  In sum, the results based on group-level analysis are consistent with the results 




                                                 
26 However these groups do not allow us to study the differences in treatment effects as it is not possible to 
have observations for endogenous initial payoffs (EndoNot).   26
5. Conclusions 
Previous literature has suggested that democratic institutions might have an effect 
on individual behavior in addition to their instrumental effect through policy choice. 
However, it has been empirically difficult to provide strong evidence for such an effect 
due to the possible endogeneity of democratic institutions and policies. Using data from a 
novel experiment design that overcomes these identification hurdles, we show that the 
effect of a given policy on behavior depends on whether it was democratically chosen or 
not. This experimental result supports the idea that democracy may have an effect on 
behavior in addition to its effect through the choice of policies. More generally, our 
results show that a treatment effect may depend on whether the treatment is endogenous 
or exogenous. The greater increase in cooperation that we observe for endogenous 
modification of payoffs relative to exogenous modification, once we control for selection, 
is what we refer to as the “endogeneity premium.” 
Understanding the forces that generate this “endogeneity premium” in our 
experiments remains for future work. One hypothesis is that an endogenous modification 
affects behavior because it reveals to the subjects that their partner is more likely to have 
voted for modification, affecting the subjects’ beliefs about the partner’s future behavior, 
and thus affecting their own behavior. A second hypothesis is that it is the endogeneity 
itself which affects behavior. Knowing that the policy was imposed by the decision of the 
group may directly affect subjects’ behavior. For example, endogenous modification may 
strengthen the establishment of a cooperative social norm. Future experimental work will 
help us distinguish between these hypotheses and provide an explanation for the   27
difference between endogenous and exogenous treatment effects in our social dilemma 
experiments.   28
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Appendix: Estimation of democracy effects using individual data after round 11. 
 
In this appendix we describe in detail the methodology used to estimate the effect 
of democracy in all rounds after the voting stage discussed in section 4.2. We focus on 
the effect of democracy under modified payoffs. The methodology we present here 
allows us to estimate the effect of democracy on behavior after “controlling” for the fact 
that subjects under endogenous modification are more likely to meet subjects that voted 
for modification than subjects under exogenous modification are. In addition, this 
methodology considers the fact that a subject’s behavior may be correlated with her 
previous behavior and be affected by the behavior of previous partners. 
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where r denotes the round number in part 2 (for simplicity we start counting from 1), i 
denotes the subject and -i denotes previous partner of i. The variable yri denotes 
cooperation in round r by subject i, yr,-i denotes cooperation in round r by subject i’s 
partner in that round, and xi is a vector of indicator variables for the four combinations of 
individual vote (yes or no) and whether votes where considered (Endo or Exo). The 
errors uri are assumed to follow these properties: ( ) 0 = ri u E , ( ) 0 = sj riu u E , and 
( ) 0 = j rix u E for any rounds r or s and subjects i or j. Note that (A1) is a linear   37
approximations to decision rules and that our inference will be valid to the extent that this 
linear approximation is reasonable. 
  To estimate the parameters in (A1) we start by estimating the system in (A2) 
which differs from (A1) in that we include the previous behavior of the subject as a 
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  It can be easily shown that the errors in (A2) coincide with the errors in (A1): 
rj ri u ε = . Given our previous assumptions about the errors in (A1) it follows that the 
errors in (A2) satisfy all the requirements for an OLS regression: 
()0 = ri u E , ( ) 0 = sj riu u E ,   ( ) 0 = j rix u E  for any subjects i and j and rounds r and s, and 
finally  ( ) 0 = sj riy u E  for any subjects i and j and rounds r and s such that s<r. 
  From the vector of estimated coefficients  ) ˆ , ˆ , ˆ ( rs rs r f r b  for (A2) we can construct 
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This is straightforward for r=1, as the first equation in (A1) coincides with the first 
equation in (A2) and  1 1 ˆ ˆ b = β . For r=2, we can use the first equation in (A2) to substitute 
for u1i in the second equation in (A1) and then: 
() i i i i i u y y b x y 2 , 1 21 1 21 1 21 2 2 + + + − = − ϕ ρ ρ β . 
Which implies that  1 21 2 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ b b ρ β − = ,  21 21 ˆ ˆ ρ = r  and  21 21 ˆ ˆ ϕ = f . Rearranging, we find the 
equalities in (A3) for r=2. For r=3, we can use the first two equation in (A2) to substitute 
for u1i in the third equation in (A1) and then 
() ( ) ( ) i i i i i i i u y y f y y r b b x y 2 , 2 32 , 1 21 32 31 2 32 1 21 32 31 2 32 1 31 3 3 + + − + + − + − − = − − ϕ ρ ϕ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ β
Which implies that  2 32 1 31 2 3 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ b b b ρ ρ β − − = ,  21 32 31 31 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ r r ρ ρ − = ,  32 32 ˆ ˆ ρ = r , 
21 32 31 31 ˆ ˆ ˆ f f ρ ϕ − =  and  32 32 ˆ ˆ ϕ = f . Rearranging, we find the equalities in (A3) for r=3. In 
similar way we can verify (A3) for r>3. 
  With the vector of estimates  ) ˆ , ˆ , ˆ ( rs rs r ϕ ρ β  we can calculate the effect of 
democracy by round. As said before, we focus on groups with payoff modification. First, 
we calculate the direct effect of democracy by individual vote and round: DEDrv, where r 
denotes the round and v the individual vote (yes or no). The direct effect of democracy 
can be thought as the difference in cooperation under endogenous and exogenous 
modification once we control for the behavior of previous partners. This difference can 
be calculated as  Exo rv Endo rv rv DED , , ˆ ˆ β β − = , where  Endo rv, ˆ β  is the estimated coefficient for 
those in round r, with individual vote v and whose vote was counted (endogenous 
modification) and  Exo rv, ˆ β  is the coefficient for those whose vote was not counted 
(exogenous modification).   39
The effect of democracy is not only the direct effect as a subject’s behavior is 
modified by the behavior of other subjects which in turn depend on whether payoffs are 
modified endogenously or exogenously. We calculate the effect of democracy  rv ED  on 
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where  rs ϕ ˆ  is the estimated coefficient measuring how subjects’ cooperation in round r 
responds to cooperation by their partners in round s, and  vy p  and  vn p  denotes the 
probabilities that a subject with vote v meets a yes and no subject respectively under 
endogenous modification. The estimates of the effect of democracy under modification 
are presented in Table 6. Table 2: Summary statistics of sessions
Session 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Date 3/5/06 10/5/06 12/5/06 15/5/06 17/5/06 13/7/06 18/9/06 22/9/06 13/10/06
Subjects 20 16 16 20 12 12 12 16 24
Economics 10.00% 6.25% 12.50% 15.00% 16.67% 16.67% 33.33% 25.00% 8.33%
Class 1.90 1.63 2.19 2.45 2.42 3.25 2.08 2.13 2.08
Political Philosophy 2.26 2.00 2.36 2.11 1.91 2.09 1.91 2.43 2.21
SAT Math 730.79 697.33 736.88 734.00 662.73 706.36 743.33 711.88 720.87
SAT Verbal 723.16 728.67 720.00 736.00 689.00 720.91 717.50 681.25 723.48
Beauty Contest Num. 39.20 37.94 39.50 38.75 42.25 44.00 38.08 49.63 31.92
Subject Comprehension
   Vote stage 80.00% 81.25% 93.75% 100.00% 100.00% 91.67% 100.00% 81.25% 91.67%
   Initial Payoffs 90.00% 93.75% 81.25% 85.00% 100.00% 91.67% 83.33% 81.25% 95.83%
   Modified Payoffs 65.00% 75.00% 62.50% 70.00% 91.67% 58.33% 91.67% 93.75% 100.00%
Earnings
   Maximum 29.00 28.20 29.40 28.20 28.20 28.60 26.40 28.20 28.68
   Average 24.44 24.23 24.86 24.42 24.78 24.35 24.16 23.62 25.51
   Minimum 20.60 20.40 20.60 20.80 21.80 20.40 19.20 17.60 20.80
Session 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Date 20/10/06 23/10/06 27/10/06 30/10/06 06/11/06 10/11/06 17/11/06 20/11/06 27/11/06 Total/Means Std. Dev.
Subjects 12 20 8 16 16 12 12 12 20 276
Economics 33.33% 10.00% 12.50% 18.75% 0.00% 8.33% 0.00% 16.67% 10.00% 13.41%
Class 2.00 1.85 1.88 1.50 1.81 2.00 1.83 1.75 1.80 2.02 1.11
Political Philosophy 2.25 2.00 1.86 2.00 2.00 1.91 2.08 1.92 1.95 2.09 0.77
SAT Math 732.50 746.67 733.75 734.00 722.00 758.33 662.73 764.17 728.00 724.91 68.17
SAT Verbal 721.67 718.89 736.25 737.33 724.67 728.33 750.00 730.83 729.50 723.21 66.72
Beauty Contest Num. 35.92 37.10 28.63 37.56 30.44 28.67 47.25 37.00 35.30 37.68 19.63
Subject Comprehension
   Vote stage 91.67% 95.00% 100.00% 87.50% 87.50% 100.00% 91.67% 100.00% 95.00% 92.03%
   Initial Payoffs 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 81.25% 81.25% 100.00% 66.67% 75.00% 95.00% 89.13%
   Modified Payoffs 75.00% 85.00% 100.00% 75.00% 68.75% 100.00% 41.67% 100.00% 95.00% 80.43%
Earnings
   Maximum 26.40 28.40 26.80 27.60 27.60 26.60 27.64 28.20 29.36 29.40
   Average 24.50 24.41 25.49 24.36 24.15 24.45 24.17 25.83 24.75 24.57 2.19
   Minimum 21.80 19.80 23.40 20.20 20.76 21.48 20.56 22.00 19.60 17.60
All Sessions
Note: Economics is the percentage of Economics majors in the session; Class is equal to 1 for freshment, 2 for sophomore, etc.; Political Philosophy is equal to 1 for 
very liberal to 5 for very conservative; Beauty contest num. is the number chosen in the beauty contest game.Table 3: Determinants of Voting
Dependent Variable: Voting for modification (Votemod)
(1) (2) (3) (8) (7) (6) (5) (4) (9)
Own Part 1 Coop. 0.47 0.673
[0.161]*** [0.170]***




Guess Number -0.003 -0.004
[0.002]** [0.002]**
SAT Verbal 0.001 0
[0.000] [0.000]






Constant 0.448 0.608 0.59 0.657 0.01 -0.312 0.523 0.517 -0.733
[0.042]*** [0.048]*** [0.063]*** [0.065]*** [0.334] [0.324] [0.032]*** [0.091]*** [0.454]
Observations 276 276 276 276 265 266 276 254 246
R-squared 0.03 0.01 0 0.02 0.01 0.03 0 0 0.15
Note: All results are from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is Votemod which is an indicator variable for whether the 
subject voted to modify payoffs. Standard errors in brackets: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.Table 4: The effect of the democracy - Individual Level Data
Panel A: Number of observations
Vote for Modify Not Modify Modify Not Modify
Modify (EndoMod) (EndoNot) (ExoMod) (ExoNot) Total
No 17 55 31 26 129
Yes 55 25 33 34 147
Total 72 80 64 60
Panel B: Cooperation Percentage in Round 10
Vote for Modify Not Modify Modify Not Modify
Modify (EndoMod) (EndoNot) (ExoMod) (ExoNot)
No 5.88% 3.64% 9.68% 11.54%
Yes 5.45% 4.00% 9.09% 8.82%
Total 5.56% 3.75% 9.38% 10.00%
Panel C: Cooperation Percentage in Round 11
Vote for Modify Not Modify Modify Not Modify
Modify (EndoMod) (EndoNot) (ExoMod) (ExoNot)
No 41.18% 14.55% 41.94% 3.85%
Yes 81.82% 24.00% 57.58% 23.53%
Total 72.22% 17.50% 50.00% 15.00%
Consider Votes Not Consider Votes
Consider Votes Not Consider Votes
Consider Votes Not Consider VotesTable 5: The effect of the democracy - Individual Level Data
Dependent Variable: Individual cooperation in round 11









EndoModn 0.412 0.362 0.4 0.353
[0.101]*** [0.102]*** [0.106]*** [0.106]***
EndoNotn 0.145 0.05 0.137 0.058
[0.056]** [0.067] [0.057]** [0.069]
ExoModn 0.419 0.314 0.4 0.316
[0.075]*** [0.086]*** [0.075]*** [0.086]***
ExoNotn 0.038 -0.016 0.045 -0.001
[0.082] [0.084] [0.087] [0.090]
EndoMody 0.818 0.719 0.849 0.763
[0.056]*** [0.063]*** [0.056]*** [0.064]***
EndoNoty 0.24 0.09 0.273 0.134
[0.083]*** [0.090] [0.087]*** [0.095]
ExoMody 0.576 0.431 0.633 0.502
[0.072]*** [0.082]*** [0.075]*** [0.085]***
ExoNoty 0.235 0.112 0.226 0.121
[0.071]*** [0.079] [0.074]*** [0.080]
Own Part 1 Coop. 0.618 0.569
[0.139]*** [0.141]***
Partners' Part 1 Coop. -0.034 -0.066
[0.179] [0.181]
Exclude did not remember 
vote result No No No Yes Yes
Observations 276 276 276 254 254
R-squared 0.54 0.57 0.6 0.6 0.62
Tests of differences of cooperation rates by mechanism (Endo versus Exo),






EndoNotn=ExoNotn 0.281 0.494 0.381 0.566
EndoModn=ExoModn 0.952 0.694 1.000 0.772
EndoModn=EndoNotn 0.022 0.006 0.030 0.013
ExoModn=ExoNotn 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.006
EndoNoty=ExoNoty 0.966 0.834 0.682 0.908
EndoMody=ExoMody 0.009 0.001 0.022 0.005
EndoMody=EndoNoty 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ExoMody=ExoNoty 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
Note: All results are from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether the subject 
cooperated in round 11. The explanatory variables in column (1) are indicator variables for the vote stage result. In the rest 
of the columns the explanatory variable are the interaction of indicator variables for vote stage results with indicator 
variables for the vote of the subject. EndoMod: endogenous modification, EndoNot: endogenous non-modification, ExoMod:
exogenous modification, ExoNot: exogenous non-modification, n and y denote the individual vote of the subject (agains or 
for modification). Regressions in columns (3) and (5) control for the individuals' and their partner's cooperation rate in the 
rounds before the voting stage (Part 1). Standard errors in brackets: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 























Note: table reports estimated impact of democracy on likelyhood of choosing C by round for 
groups with modified payoffs following the model in the Appendix. Jackknife standard errors 
by group: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.Table 7: Number of Groups by Vote Stage Results and Vote Share
Modify Not Modify Modify Not Modify
Vote Share (EndoMod) (EndoNot) (ExoMod) (ExoNot) Total
0 X300 3
1 X954 1 8
2 6854 2 3
3 5X66 1 7
4 7X01 8
Total 18 20 16 15 69
Table 8: The effect of democracy - Group Level Data
Panel A: Cooperation Percentage in Part 1
Modify Not Modify Modify Not Modify
Vote Share (EndoMod) (EndoNot) (ExoMod) (ExoNot)
0 X 19.17%
1 X 21.39% 31.00% 11.25%
2 11.25% 16.88% 16.50% 16.88%
3 12.00% X 17.92% 19.58%
4 20.36% X 10.00%
Panel B: Cooperation Percentage in Part 2
Modify Not Modify Modify Not Modify
Vote Share (EndoMod) (EndoNot) (ExoMod) (ExoNot)
0 X 21.67%
1 X 11.67% 24.50% 12.50%
2 51.67% 8.44% 43.50% 9.38%
3 48.00% X 32.50% 12.50%
4 88.93% X 7.50%
Consider Votes Not Consider Votes
Consider Votes Not Consider Votes
Consider Votes Not Consider VotesTable 9: The effect of democracy - Group level data - Voteshare=2
Dependent Variable: Group cooperation rate in part 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EndoMod 0.517 0.404 0.538 0.45
[0.090]*** [0.117]*** [0.094]*** [0.123]***
EndoNot 0.084 -0.085 0.079 -0.047
[0.078] [0.139] [0.071] [0.134]
ExoMod 0.435 0.27 0.3 0.19
[0.099]*** [0.149]* [0.094]*** [0.136]
ExoNot 0.094 -0.075 0.108 -0.015
[0.111] [0.158] [0.109] [0.155]
Part 1 Cooperation 1.002 0.704
[0.687] [0.636]
Exclude did not remember 
vote result No No Yes Yes
Observations 23 23 18 18
R-squared 0.74 0.77 0.76 0.78
Tests of differences of cooperation rates by mechanism (Endo versus Exo) and payoffs (Mod versus Not)
p-values
EndoNot=ExoNot 0.946 0.944 0.822 0.806
EndoMod=ExoMod 0.550 0.333 0.096 0.074
EndoMod=EndoNot 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
ExoMod=ExoNot 0.033 0.028 0.204 0.176
Note: All results are from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the cooperation rate by group in the 
10 rounds after the voting stage (part 2). The explanatory variables are indicator variables for the vote 
stage result. EndoMod: endogenous modification, EndoNot: endogenous non-modification, ExoMod: 
exogenous modification, ExoNot: exogenous non-modification. Regressions in columns (2) and (4) control 
for the cooperation rate of the group before the voting stage (Part 1). Standard errors in brackets: * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The p-values correspond to Wald tests based 



















































































































Did not vote for modification
Figure 3: Cooperation by Round, Vote Stage Results and Individual Vote